



The Limits of Globalization in the 21st Century

Nationalism, Regionalism and Violence

Juergensmeyer, Mark

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Center for International Studies
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**The Limits of Globalization in
the 21st Century: Nationalism,
Regionalism and Violence**

by

Mark Juergensmeyer



SPIRIT

School for Postgraduate
Interdisciplinary Research on
Interculturalism and Transnationality

Center for International Studies
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Aalborg University

Fibigerstræde 2

Dk-9220 Aalborg Ø, Denmark

Phone + 45 96 35 91 33

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**THE LIMITS OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE 21st CENTURY:
NATIONALISM, REGIONALISM, AND VIOLENCE**

Mark Juergensmeyer

University of California, Santa Barbara

In 1989, it was possible for Francis Fukuyama to assert that the ending of the Cold War had led to an 'end of history' - by which he meant an end to ideological forms of political order.¹

In their place, according to Fukuyama, a worldwide consensus had been created in favor of secular liberal democracy, which the world inherited from the European Enlightenment, and which Fukuyama regarded as non-ideological and value-free. His illusions about a history free of ideology,

¹ Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History' *The National Interest* 16, Summer 1989, 3-18; and *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), xi-xxiii.

a universal acceptance of 'value-free' Enlightenment views, and the emergence of a peaceful 'new world order' were short-lived dreams, but they were shared by many astute observers at the time, including then- President George Bush and many other Western leaders who cheered the end of the Soviet era and the demise of the Cold War. They assumed that the West had won. These hopes were shattered by the violent eruption of virulent new forms of localism and regionalism, an unbridled global capitalism, and the ideological emergence of religious and ethnic nationalisms around the world. For these reasons, it now appears that in many ways, both sides of the old Cold War--Soviet and West - lost.

Confronted with these contrary signs other political observers noted that all was not well in the 'new world order'. Writing in 1993, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Columbia professor who had served as President Jimmy Carter's advisor for international affairs, claimed that the world had gone 'out of control'.² Representative Daniel P. Moynihan, who is a Harvard professor as well as a member of the U.S. Congress, warned of the cultural anarchy and 'pandae-monium' that will result if tribalism runs amock and a set of civilized values around the world are allowed to collapse.³

I heard another view of what is wrong in the new world order earlier this summer when I spent a day in a United States Federal Prison interviewing a convicted co-conspirator in the World Trade Center bombing. The convicted bomber, Mahmud Abouhalima - an Egyptian who had fought with the Mujahudeen in Afghanistan before coming to the United States where he joined forces with other supporters of the radical Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman - regarded his form of radical Islamic politics not as the cause of global

² Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Scribners, 1993).

³ Daniel P. Moynihan, *Pandae-monium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

anarchy but the solution. Speaking of the contemporary political crisis in the Middle East, Abouhalima said that 'Islam is a mercy, a rudder in a stormy sea'.⁴ In his view, as in the view of many other religious nationalists around the world, there is a new war replacing the old cold war - the war between religious nationalism and the secular state. From his point of view, the outcome of that war will lead to a new world order, a new peace.

But it is not the only confrontation in contemporary global society, nor is it the only prognosis for global peace. Several books in the past several years have tried to assess the current situation. In this lecture I want to assess these books - Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld*, and my own *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* - and move beyond their limitations to consider the possibilities for world order in the 21st century.

CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

Almost before the ink had dried on Samuel P. Huntington's arresting essay, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', the debate had begun over whether the prophecy implied in the question was possible, whether labels for civilizations like 'Western' or 'Confucian' are apt, and whether hegemonic cultural constructions such as 'civilizations' exist at all.⁵

⁴ Interview with Mahmud Abouhalima, convicted co-defendant in the bombing of the World Trade Center, at the United States Penitentiary, Lompoc, August 19, 1997.

⁵ The essay was originally published in *Foreign Affairs* 72:3(Summer 1993), pp. 2-11, and reprinted in *The New York Times* and in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations? A Debate*, with responses by Fouad Ajami, Robert L. Bartley, Liu Binyan, et al. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). See

His essay - written quickly and facilely - brought a storm of discussion and criticism, and unfortunately for the critics who enjoyed attacking Huntington for this simplistic essay, he took the time to rewrite it in a more thoughtful and thorough manner in the book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, which was published last year, in 1996. Still, among its five central propositions are some very controversial ones. In this book, Huntington suggests:

1 - that global politics, for the first time in history, is multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization; and it is not producing a single universal civilization (positions that I think are basically true).

2 - that the balance of power in the world is shifting: the West is declining in strength, Asia is rising, and Islam is exploding (positions that essentially reflect what is reported in the daily newspapers).

3 - that a civilization-based world order is emerging: here Huntington does not talk about the 'clash of civilizations' that made his earlierf essay so infamous, but about cooperation among common-civilization societies, and countries grouping around core states. (Five main civilizations are identified: Sinic (not Confucian, the term he used in the first essay), Japanese (now included as different from, and in addition to, Sinic civilization), Hindu, Islamic, and 'Western' - he also mentions the possibilities of Latin American or African civilization as well. (Even in revised form, this is still a problematic formulation.))

also Samuel P. Huntington, 'If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World' *Foreign Affairs* 72:5 (November/December 1993), pp. 186-94. A revised and expanded form of the thesis is presented in Huntington's book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

4 - that the West's universalistic pretensions bring it into conflict with other civilizations, mostly Islam and China (a position I think is demonstrably true); and that Muslim civilization tends to be violent. (The latter is one of his most controversial positions, and one that repeats an unfortunate statement in his essay, that 'Islam has bloody borders'. He not only repeats this controversial and possibly racist statement, but defends with some very dubious statistics, such as those that show that Muslim states are more heavily armed than Christian ones.⁶ The problem is that these statistics include such countries as Norway and Denmark as Christian states - which are supported by US military might - and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria as Muslim states. The latter, of course, are more militaristic, but the question is whether this is due to the configuration of global politics, rather than Islam is a religion. Huntington does include, among the five reasons he gives as to why Islam is militaristic, two reasons that Muslims themselves sometimes give for the militarization of Muslim states: their response to western militarism and aggrandizement, and the lack of 'core states' like the United States to provide an umbrella of military support. But Huntington again repeats the myth that Islam by nature is more militaristic than other religious traditions.⁷

5 - that the 'survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity'.⁸ (This remarkable statement runs counter to the multiculturalism currently in vogue in American intellectual circles, but Huntington does close his book with the proclamation that the future of world civilization is in the acceptance of a multicultural world, a statement with which I hardly agree.)

Central to all of these position is the notion that there are 'civilizations', and

⁶ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations... World Order*, p. 258.

⁷ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations... World Order*, pp. 263-65.

⁸ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations... World Order*, p. 20.

that in some sense they are in 'conflict'. On this central position I hesitantly agree with Huntington. My position is that civilizations do exist - though Huntington's labels for them, including 'Western' and 'Confucian' or 'Sinic' are highly debatable. Moreover, I think that the current social and political unrest around the globe is caused less by a clash of civilizations than by a widespread dissatisfaction with all of them. What may emerge out of this discord are two other possibilities than the one that Huntington optimistically suggested, a multicultural world. We might end up with global cultural anarchy, or a global cultural consensus over a new worldwide civilization. Or both. To explore this thesis, let me use the example of the United States. Although Huntington, like many American writers, confidently speaks of Western civilization as if the American version of it were normative, American culture is largely derived from its European antecedents and then shaped into an American mold; and American civilization is not necessarily European civilization. It is somewhat analogous to the way that Japanese culture has taken elements from Chinese and other sources and molded them into a distinctively Japanese tradition; for this reason, Japanese writers chafe at being put into a Chinese Confucian pigeonhole.⁹ So when one speaks of 'Western civilization' it is well to wonder not only what one means by that term, but also whether one is speaking of its American or European version.

It is also well to wonder if by 'Western civilization' one is speaking of its religious or secular tradition of values. Western civilization is sometimes construed as the tradition of secular civil society that can be traced back to its origins with the Greeks and Romans, and then re-emerged with the European Enlightenment thinkers in the eighteenth century. For instance, the historian Hans Kohn traced the history of the modern concept of nationalism back to the ancient Greeks, then skipped two thousand years to the seventeenth

⁹ See, for instance, Tetsuya Kataoka, *The Truth About the Japanese Threat: Misperceptions of the Sam Huntington Thesis* (Stanford CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1995).

century and England, which he described as 'the first modern nation'.¹⁰ Although Kohn touched on the biblical tradition, he and other scholars usually identify classical Greece as the fount of Western civilization, and the thousand or so years of Europe's middle ages and the Holy Roman Empire are simply 'dark ages'.

The reason for this neglect of religion in Western civilization is that contemporary Americans and Europeans view it from the perspective of a Western civilization shaped by the secular values of the Enlightenment. The religious Western civilization that preceded the Enlightenment's influence is to a large extent a different civilization. For this reason, I prefer to speak not of one 'Western civilization' but of two: Christendom and Modernism. The former refers to social and political values shaped by Christianity, and the latter to those values shaped by the Enlightenment and the secular philosophic tradition labeled 'Philosophia', by one historian who compared it with what he regarded its comparable entities, religious traditions.¹¹ American culture shows influences from both Christendom and Modernism, and each of these has had implications for the way the United States has interacted with other cultures and civilizations in the world.

JIHAD vs McWORLD

In the last decades of the twentieth century the most visible form of American Modernism abroad is economic and cultural: the ubiquitous consumer franchises and entertainment media. In a provocative magazine article, which

¹⁰ Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1955, p. 16.

¹¹ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "Philosophia as One of the Religious Traditions of Humankind," in *Difference, Valeur, Hierarchie* (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales), pp. 265-75.

like Huntington's essay was eventually enlarged into a book, Benjamin R. Barber analyzes these multinational and transnational corporate networks symbolized by such fast-food restaurants as McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken. He also observes the cultural side of this economic invasion: the movies, videos, and music compact discs which portray the saucier side of modern (usually American) culture, from Madonna to 'Santa Barbara' (by which I mean the television series - not the real city, my home town, which is much tamer in real life than on television). These two aspects of contemporary Modernist culture exported around the world Barber dubs 'McWorld'. He fears that their assault on public consciousness in various parts of the world has triggered the 'Jihad' of militant tribalism.¹²

The author, who is a professor of political science at Rutgers University and director of the Walt Whitman Center for the Study of Democracy, is ultimately concerned with neither McWorld nor Jihad, but with the perilous state of democracy throughout the world which he feels is endangered by both. The renegade international corporate capitalism that lies behind McWorld is ultimately accountable to no government nor any society's set of social and ethical standards. Nor is it held in check by a stable labor force capable of exerting countervailing pressure the way that labor unions have learned to do within this century. Rather, labor is part of a commodity chain that may have several national locations. Cotton that is grown in India may be made into fabric in Malaysia and sewn into shirts in China for an international market, including America's ubiquitous K-Mart and WalMart discount stores. A Barbie Doll is said to be manufactured in four different countries. If a labor force in, say, Mexico is getting cranky, difficult, and demanding of higher wages, a trans-national corporation can simply go south

¹² Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995). The book is based on the author's widely-discussed essay published in 1993 in *The Atlantic*.

to Guatemala, or west to the Philippines, Malaysia, or, more and more frequently, China. It's a small McWorld, after all. The 'Jihad' response to 'McWorld' is a serious matter. In many areas of Asia and the Middle East, the movies and fast-food outlets of 'McWorld' are considered forms of cultural colonialism, and have helped to fuel movements of religious nationalism in opposition to them. In Iran, for example, one of the things that most troubled the Ayatollah Khomeini about the urban society in Tehran before the Islamic revolution was what he and others referred to 'as-toxification' or 'Westomania'.¹³ Although Islamic peoples have been infatuated with Westomania to some extent since the eighth century, the Ayatollah maintained that this infatuation had been encouraged and exploited by Western businessmen. The goal of the Islamic revolution in Iran, then, was not only to free Iranians politically from the Shah but also to liberate them conceptually from Western ways of thinking. Another Iranian leader, Abolhassan Banisadr, agreed, claiming that the West assumed that in economic and cultural matters it had 'prior rights to the rest of the world'.¹⁴ It is this presumptuousness of the West, rightly identified by both Huntington and Barber as a basis for resentment and anti-western animosity around the world, that gives rise to the new movements of religious nationalism.

¹³ The terms "Westomania" and "West-toxification" are translations of the Farsi word, *gharbzadegi*, coined by Jalal Al-e Ahmad. It is discussed in Michael C. Hillmann's "Introduction" to Jalal Al-e Ahmad, *The School Principal*, trans. by John K. Newton, Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1974.

¹⁴ Abolhassan Banisadr, *The Fundamental Principles and Precepts of Islamic Government*, trans by Mohammad R. Ghanoonparvar, Lexington, KY: Mazda Publishers, 1981, p. 40.

THE NEW COLD WAR?

Exploring these movements from Iran to Idaho, and the global cultural and political factors that lay behind them, was the purpose of my book, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. In this book, and in the book on religious terrorism in which I am currently engaged, I look at threats to Modernism as a civilization, not only from outside but also from within. To a large extent the features of Modernist cultures have been criticized and sometimes rejected not only in formerly colonized countries but also in the heartland of Western countries. In America, for instance, there are abundant signs of discomfort over the alienation of individualistic society, the coldness of rationalistic institutions, and the moral relativity of secular culture. This discomfort has led to a resurgent interest in spirituality and a revived interest in an American religious nationalism, represented in its most extreme forms by the Christian militia and the Christian Identity movement, groups that feed on what I have described in my book as a widespread 'loss of faith' in the secularism of modern civilization.¹⁵ This loss of faith has been linked to a perception that secular institutions have failed to perform. In many parts of the world the secular state has not lived up to its own promises of political freedom, economic prosperity, and social justice. The government scandals, persistent social inequities, and devastating economic difficulties of the USA and the USSR in the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, made both capitalist and socialist forms of society less appealing than they had been in those more innocent decades, the 1940s and 1950s. The global mass media have brought to everyone's attention the malaise in America caused by the social failures of unwed mothers, divorce, racism, and drug addiction; the political failures of Watergate, Irangate, and the Vietnam war; and the economic failures of the Savings and Loan crisis and the mounting deficit.

¹⁵ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) p. 11.

The political scandals of England, Japan and other modern societies have been equally widely publicized.

Although the news media have greatly exaggerated these problems in American and other industrial societies, these dismal reports have led some people to a disappointment that has deepened into a lack of trust in public institutions. They experience what Jurgen Habermas has dubbed a modern 'crisis of legitimation', in which the public's respect for political and social institutions has been deflated throughout the world.¹⁶ Religious leaders have been able to capitalize on this disenchantment. Perhaps many of them never did believe in the validity of secular Modernist values, but now they were able to convince masses of people within their societies, in part because great numbers of them no longer saw modern civilization as an expression of their own values, nor did they see it improving their social and economic situations. More important, they failed to see how the Western versions of secular nationalism could provide a vision of what they would like themselves and their nation to become.

The legitimation crisis of modern societies has led some writers to observe that Modernism as a civilization may be on the rocks. History may be entering into a period of postmodernism, where not everyone subscribes to the same view of history, and such values as individualism, equality and a respect for secular civil law are not held equally by all. (Here I am using 'postmodern' to describe actual social phenomena, and not, as the term is sometimes used, a genre of literary and social analysis).¹⁷ Part of the reason why Modernism as a civilization is in trouble is that its main political artifact,

¹⁶ Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. by Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1975, passim.

¹⁷ For the distinction between postmodernity as a social phenomenon and as a mode of analysis, see David Lyon, *Postmodernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

the nation-state, is in trouble. Earlier in this century the nation-state was deemed to be the essential building block for the 'world system' as envisaged both by businessmen and political strategists as well as by critical thinkers such as Immanuel Wallerstein.¹⁸ It was not only the ultimate locus of authority within a territory, but consisted of a relatively self-contained population, economic system, environmental habitat, social identity, and set of cultural values.

Increasingly, however, the old nation-state is no longer self-contained in any of these familiar ways. Its economy is integrated into world markets, and sections of it are purchased outright by corporations that are either foreign, multicultural, or transnational - not beholden to the location or laws of any single country. Its population is fluid: Los Angeles, for example, has become a major center for Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Korea, not only because so many people from these countries live in LA, but also because their economies and cultures are intertwined. Environmental problems in one country affect not only its neighbors but, in the case of deforestation and global warming, the whole world. And as the author of *Jihad vs. McWorld* has observed, the youth of major urban centers throughout the world dance to the same music and watch the same videos.

At one time it could be said that the nation-state would remain intact as long as it had its own military and currency. But in the contemporary world, the cost of sophisticated military technology leaves America, NATO and a few other forces virtually alone as the world's policemen. And the viability of the Japanese yen, the German mark, and the American dollar makes these currencies more valued than local currencies in many parts of the world. Moreover, the increased use of credit cards and other forms of electronic

¹⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein's classic statement on the role of nation-states in world politics has been updated in his *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

monetary transfer will, in time, make paper and metal currency symbolic rather than real expressions of economic self-sufficiency.

But just when the nation-state appears to be irrelevant, the idea of the nation state in some areas of the world has been rescued by what a few years ago would have been an unlikely ally: movements for religious nationalism. In countries controlled by the former Soviet Union, for example, local religious and cultural traditions have provided identities that were deprived from them when they were simply one more unit in a vast Soviet bloc. Movements of cultural nationalism are successful in part because the old nation-state is not needed for any other reason, including economic or military ones. Hence in an area such as the Baltic, the economies of such small and oddly-shaped nations as Slovakia and Croatia can survive insofar as they participate in a larger world economy; the entity of Yugoslavia is no longer helpful or necessary for their economic existence. For this reason, movements for cultural nationalism - even those that yearn to create the tiniest of nations - are viable in a world where the economic and military reasons for a nation-state no longer exist. Hence new nationalisms can emerge precisely because the nation-state is weak.

The weakening of the nation-state in various parts of the world, however, has consequences for Modernism as a civilization. Insofar as the loss of economic and military reasons for a nation-state gives an impetus to new religious nationalisms, Modernism is challenged on a local level. But it is also challenged globally, for multinational businesses and entertainment media are moving beyond the Modernist ambit to a transnational urban culture that is not tied, as Modernism was, to traditional national societies. This means that on both local and international levels, Modernism as a civilization is about to undergo a global transformation. Or perhaps it will be replaced.

THE EMERGING GLOBAL CIVILIZATION

In the analyses of Huntington, Barber and myself, there is consensus that the world appears to be poised on the brink of an enormous cultural change. In Huntington's terms it is the resurgence of civilizations that have come to clash; in Barber's terms it is the centrifugal forces of McWorld spinning outward into a trans-national market and a global culture, and the centripetal Jihad forces of localism undermining national democracies from within; in the terms I offered in *The New Cold War*, it is the end of the global faith in the values of Enlightenment modernism that has led to new attempts to base moral societies and public virtues in traditional values. All of these analyses suggest that Modernism is finished as a civilization -- or at least as the exclusive leader of global civilization. But if that is the case, what will take its place? I see several options for world order in the near future:

1. Fortress Modernica: an attempt by the formerly Modern societies of Europe and America to shore up their common identities, and say 'to hell with the rest of the world'. This is the direction I see Huntington leading when he says that 'the survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity'.¹⁹

2. The North vs. the South: a growing chasm between the McWorld society of transnational corporate capitalism and satellite television culture, and the tribal, Jihad-oriented societies described by Benjamin R. Barber.²⁰

3. Regionalism - Global Balkanization: an expansion of the economic and cultural ties currently being forged by NAFTA (among Canada, Mexico and the United States), East Asian financial liaisons, the European partners of the

¹⁹ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations... World Order*, 20-21.

²⁰ Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*.

European Union, and the Islamic trade alliance that extends from Central Asia to North Africa and the Middle East. In this scenario a 'clash of civilizations' - or at least of regional economic partnerships - is indeed a real possibility.

4. Global civilization: a new consensus over fundamental social values, similar to that enjoyed by Modernism in the West in the past two centuries, but now supported by a variety of cultural traditions, not just the Enlightenment. This scenario could co-exist with one or more of the previous ones, as a stratum of global civilization develops over time, and in addition to the particularistic values of individual societies. The last is clearly the most intriguing. Signs of such an emerging civilization are appearing in areas of the world where the cultural mix of the population puts them on the front lines of intercultural encounter and global demographic change. The picture, however, is not altogether pretty. In California, for example, the pessimistic view of America's multicultural future is symbolized by the 1992 unrest in Los Angeles involving Hispanics, African Americans and Koreans, which was less an orchestrated riot than it was a sheer collapse of civil order. When poor Black neighborhoods of South-Central Los Angeles erupted in anger over the jury's non-guilty verdict in the trial of police officers accused of beating a Black man, Rodney King, they were joined by large numbers of Hispanics, and their targets were often Korean-owned groceries, liquor stores, and convenience stores. The rampage killed scores, caused an estimated \$735 million damage, and was televised live throughout the United States. But there is also an optimistic scenario regarding multiculturalism, and it is symbolized by what has happened in Los Angeles in the years since 1992. The rebuilding of South-Central Los Angeles has been a slow affair, and it is far from being a perfect society. But it is one that has created a modicum of civic pride and a growing respect for the diversity of Los Angeles' common cultural heritages. As one Hispanic leader put it, 'the riots

created the opportunity for bringing communities together'.²¹ Postmodern multicultural societies like Los Angeles, therefore, may be the incubators for an emerging polyglot civilization, that, for want of a better term, might be called Global Civilization, or simply Globalism. Like Modernism, Globalism has more than domestic significance, and it may or may not be imperialistic in its encounter with other traditions. The question is whether its various cultural elements -- the European, Hispanic, African, Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and other cultural heritages of Los Angeles, for instance -- can retain their integrity in a Global culture or whether they are transformed into a homogeneous stew with little specific integrity. The results are too early to be definitive.

The most harmonious outcome of the current cultural encounter is one where values from traditional civilizations -- such as a respect for the past, communal identities, and the demand for morality in public life - can be joined with the more salutary aspects of Modernism, including a respect for rational decisions, equal treatment before the law, a toleration of differences, and the protection of the rights of minorities and individuals. And from both kinds of civilizations, this optimistic outcome of Globalism would retain a spirit of progress about the future.

But even the most optimistic vision of a single, shared Global civilization is not necessarily a formula for peace. Throughout history some of the most vicious wars have been within civilizations - family quarrels, like the one between two great Modernist powers, the US and USSR. Yet the global sharing of basic values can be a basis for at least a modicum of cooperation between various parts of the world, and allow for a more or less orderly transition to new patterns of economic, social and political association that

²¹ Carlos Vaquerano, quoted in Miles Corwin, 'Understanding the Riots--Six Months Later', Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1992.

will transform and in some cases replace the nation-state. An expansion of the United Nations' role in peacekeeping, human rights, economic regulation, and environmental protection, for example, would be the logical extension of shared global values.

It is not an unlikely outcome, but this scenario will have to contend with the others for primacy in the coming decades. If it is possible to forge a common denominator among the various cultural traditions, to bridle the moralism and naive optimism of religious civilizations and temper them with the rationality of Modernism, and to leaven the Modernist illusions about the invincibility of human knowledge with a religious sense of the limitations of the human condition, then it is possible to imagine the emerging multi-cultural civilization of the twenty-first century, Globalism, providing a cultural basis for both social identity and political order. The anarchic alternatives, to my mind, are dismal ones. And since the societies of the world are already forced together increasingly by a technological and communications intimacy, it is not too difficult a leap of imagination to think of a sharing of values on a global scale as well.